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G-GAMES WITH COALITIONS
ROY CERQUETI AND EMILIO DE SANTIS
Abstract. This paper models games where the strategies are nodes of a graph
G (we denote them as G-games) and in presence of coalition structures. The
cases of one-shot and repeated games are presented. In the latter situation,
coalitions are assumed to move from a strategy to another one under the con-
straint that they are adjacent in the graph. We introduce novel concepts of
pure and mixed equilibria which are comparable with classical Nash and Berge
equilibria. A Folk Theorem for G-games of repeated type is presented. More-
over, equilibria are proven to be described through suitably defined Markov
Chains, hence leading to a constrained Monte Carlo Markov Chain procedure.
Keywords: Game theory; Graphs; Repeated games; constrained Monte Carlo
Markov Chain.
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1. Introduction
We present evolutionary game models where the strategies have a graph struc-
ture. The players may pass from a strategy to an adjacent one in the graph or,
alternatively, they can hold their positions. The target of each player is the maxi-
mization of her/his payoff, and players are allowed to form coalitions.
Taking the strategies of the game as the nodes of a graph has an intuitive moti-
vation. In fact, we have in mind that the change of a decision is usually a stepwise
process over a continuum of alternatives, where the decider modifies her/his sta-
tus by selecting a status which is close to the previous one. Think about a game
where the strategies of the single players are the positions on a lattice, and at any
time they have to decide a new position in the neighborhood of the previous one.
Such situations commonly appear in the real world. This is the case of physical
restrictions in the actions, with players constrained to move from a position (or
strategy) to an adjacent one. An example might be the location strategies with
time constraints: each player selects a geographical location which is achievable
from her/his current position in no more than 10 minutes walking. It is clear that
the selected position will be close (adjacent, in some sense) to the previous one.
Some relevant contributions in game theory discuss the cases of interacting play-
ers, who are then viewed as nodes of a graph (see e.g. [33] and the recent contribu-
tion [41] with references therein). This setting is associated to the strategic behavior
of the agents, whose connections of local types might create global behaviors.
Less attention has been paid to the case in which strategies are linked together.
In this respect, it is important to give credit to some remarkable examples in the
literature of games with strategies exhibiting a graph structure.
A graph-based structure of the strategies is presented in the context of game
colouring graphs, which is a well-known problem in game theory. In such a model,
two players alternatively select and colour a node of the graph under some adjacency
constraints and with opposite targets (for the details, see e.g. [42]).
Under different conditions, we mention also the game of cops and robber (see e.g.
[3] and the monograph [12]). In this case, the players (cops and robbers) move on
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a graph at each step to a node which is adjacent to the previous position, with the
intuitive target to escape (robber) and to catch the robber by occupying her/his
same node (cops).
The trapping games are also relevant (see [8]). Here a couple of players is con-
sidered, and they are assumed to select alternatively strategies along the arcs of a
graph. The selection of each vertex twice is forbidden, so that one of the players
loses the game when she/he cannot move (the player is trapped).
We feel that such games are close to us for one important aspect: the players
move on strategies which are adjacent nodes of a graph. However, we are more
general than the mentioned models, in that we abandon the binary situation win-
lose and the alternation of the players in moving, consider more than two players
and admit the presence of coalitions of players. Moreover, we present here a game
theoretical modeling since we do not fix payoffs or a specific target for the players
but, rather, we develop a general framework to be adapted to a plethora of special
cases.
As mentioned above, in the proposed setting we consider a partition of the set of
the players in coalitions – and in so doing, we fix a coalition structure of the game
(see e.g. [6, 35]).
We introduce and study the equilibria of the game. At this aim, we move from
the breakthrough work of Nash [34] – which relies to the context of non-cooperative
games – and consider the Berge extension of the classical Nash equilibria to coali-
tions of players (see [10]). Specifically, we extend such a concept by including the
presence of a graph structure for the strategies. In particular, we provide a defini-
tion of equilibria on the basis of the comparison of the payoffs of adjacent strategies,
hence extending the concept of the standard Berge equilibria. Indeed, Berge equi-
libria are subcases of our setting, in that they are included in our definition when
the graph of the strategies is complete.
Our framework is then adapted to the repeated games (see e.g. [5, 7, 9, 18, 29]).
More specifically, we consider a class of such games where the players move on
adjacent strategies in the graph from a time to the next one. The time horizon
T of the repeated game can be finite or infinite. The final payoff of each coalition
is assumed to be derived by the sum of the payoffs realized at each step of the
repeated game. In the situation of infinitely played repeated games – sometimes
called supergames – scholars introduce often a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) for having
the convergence of the payoffs series (see e.g. [1, 2, 23] and references therein).
The discount factor is not a mere mathematical device: it has also the intuitive
economic meaning of under evaluating the future payoffs of the repeated games.
In the present paper, we avoid the introduction of the discount factor by removing
by definition the convergence problems of the aggregated payoffs. Specifically, in
accord to classical game theory literature, we take the total payoff of the supergame
as the liminf of the mean of the payoffs of the one-shot games (see e.g. [23]). In
so doing, we are in line with the literature dealing with infinitely played repeated
games without discount factor for the payoffs, where the convergence problems in
the formulation of the series of the total payoff are removed by definition (see e.g.
[17]).
We prove that it is sufficient that the dynamics on the graph is driven by Markov
chains, and this leads also to add results to the field of Monte Carlo Markov Chain
(MCMC). For a wide perspective on MCMC, see [4, 13], while a review of the
endless applications of MCMC should include relevant contributions like [24, 25].
In the cointext of the Markov chains, [16] studies the equilibria of a repeated
game in dependence of the memory of the players. The authors consider that the
action or strategy at any time depends only on the public knowledge related to the
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previous K stages of the game (memory K). Hence the players construct equilibria
collected in ΓK . The space of equilibria ΓK is analyzed and compared with Γ∞,
i.e. the equilibria constructed using all the past history (unbounded memory).
In [28] a one-period game with unitary memory is studied (K = 1) and a Folk
Theorem for bargaining games is presented.
For what concerns the memory of the repeated games, in our context we prove
that the connectedeness of G leads to ΓK = Γ∞, for each K ≥ 1. Moreover, we are
able to derive a new version of the Folk Theorem tailored to our specific context (see
also versions of Folk Theorems in [7, 9, 15, 19, 22, 31]). In particular, we deal with
the case T = ∞. Differently with the standard case of infinitely repeated games
without discounting – where Folk Theorem states simply that any equilibrium of
the one-shot game is also an equilibrium for the repeated game (see the seminal
contribution of [36]) – we here introduce a natural constraint to let such equilibria
be consistent with the graph G of the strategies.
In illustrating how the paper flows, some details on the treated topics are also
provided. In particular, Section 2 contains the preliminary and notations which
serve for formalizing the game models we deal with. We denote such game models
as G-games, to point the attention on the graph of the strategies G, and assume
that G is a finite graph. Moreover, such a section is devoted to the definition of the
(pure) C-equilibria for games with coalition structure C. The connection between
G-games and standard games is also discussed.
Section 3 is a technical one. It discusses the definition of (mixed) C-equilibria in
a static context. By construction, such equilibria are independent from the graph
G and depend only on the coalition structure C. Theorem 1 is an existence result
for mixed C-equilibria for G-games, that is an arrangement with our notation of
[10, 34].
Section 4 is divided into two subsections. In the first one, we focus on MCMC
problems when Markov chains are linked to graphs. Indeed, the presence of an
adjacency constraint over the strategies leads to a constrained version of MCMC,
in the sense that we will admit only nonnull transition probabilities between two
adjacent states (strategies). In this context, we are able to say whenever, given a
distribution µ, it is possible to construct a homogenenous or a nonhomogeneous
Markov chain having µ as empirical distribution (see Theorems 2 and 3). A defi-
nition of a specific class of graphs – the C-decomposable graphs – is introduced in
Definition 4 on the basis of the strong products of graphs (see [37]). This definition
will be used to introduce the repeated G-games.
In particular, C-decomposability leads to the possibility that each coalition of
players might select a strategy only on the basis of the knowledge of the past his-
tory of the game, without the need of assuming communications among coalitions.
Moreover, in this case, we do a specific construction of the MCMC that is compu-
tationally less heavy than in the general case (see Theorem 4).
The second subsection represents the conclusion of the arguments developed in
the previous parts of the paper. In fact, we introduce therein a dynamical setting by
providing the definition of repeated G-games (see the general Definition 5 and the
more specific Definition 6). Here we are able to observe that the (pure) C-equilibria
might turn out to be meaningful when a game is played T = 2 times or when T
is unknown – where unknown should be intended in the sense that the coalitions
cannot do any prediction about the end of the game.
Differently, the (mixed) C-equilibria can be used to prove a version of the Folk
Theorem in the context of repeated G-games with T = ∞ and under some con-
ditions on the information. In particular, Definition 7 formalizes C-equilibria for
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the G-repeated games when T = ∞. Then, Theorem 6 states that the multidi-
mensional Markov chain introduced in the previous subsection can be viewed as
a C-equilibrium for the G-repeated games with T = ∞, minimal information –
i.e., coalitions have knowledge only of their previously selected strategies – and in
both cases of initial strategies assigned by an external referee or selected by players
themselves. As a corollary of Theorem 6 we have the above-mentioned new version
of the Folk Theorem, which guarantees the existence of a C-equilibrium for the
G-repeated games in the considered framework.
Last section provides some conclusive remarks and traces lines for future re-
search.
2. Definition of a G-game
Consider a set of n players V = {1, . . . , n}. The j-th player has a set of kj
(pure) strategies collected in Sj = {s1j , . . . , s
kj
j }. We denote the product space of
the strategies as
S =
∏
j∈V
Sj ,
and an element s ∈ S is a profile of strategies. For j ∈ V , πj : S → R denotes
the payoff function of the j-th player. Hence, for s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S, πj(s) is the
payoff of the j-th player when the players use the profile of strategies s. The vector
of payoffs is π = (π1, . . . , πn).
For convenience we introduce a notation for strategies substitution. For a given
set C ⊂ V and s, t ∈ S we define the profile of strategies [s, t;C] ∈ S, by setting,
for its j-th component,
[s, t;C]j =
{
tj if j ∈ C;
sj if j 6∈ C.
A set C ⊂ V of players is called coalition. We are interested in the coalitions
which form a partition C = {C1, . . . , Cr} of V and we will call this partitition a
coalition structure. We consider games which present a coalition structure.
The payoff of a coalition C is a function ΠC : S → R. Sometimes, it is natural
to consider ΠC as the sum of the payoffs of the single players belonging to C, i.e.
ΠC(s) =
∑
i∈C πi(s), for s ∈ S.
For a given coalition C ⊂ V we write the set of the pure strategies of C as
SC =
∏
ℓ∈C
Sℓ.
Let us consider a G-game with coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. Let sCℓ ∈ SCℓ
for ℓ = 1, . . . , r. The profile of strategies can be written by s = (sC1 , . . . , sCr) ∈ S.
In this formalism the strategy of the j-th player can be obtained as the projection
on Sj of sCℓ¯ where ℓ¯ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} is the unique element having j ∈ Cℓ¯.
The vector of the payoffs of the coalitions C is denoted by Π = (ΠC1 , . . . ,ΠCr ).
Hereafter, we consider that the elements of S are nodes of a graph G = (S, E).
Some notations for graphs are now presented. Given two graphs G = (S, E) and
G′ = (S ′, E′) we say that G′ is a subgraph of G if S ′ ⊂ S and E′ ⊂ E, and we write
G′ ⊂ G. Moreover, the subgraph G′ ⊂ G is said to be an induced subgraph of G if
s, t ∈ S ′ and {s, t} ∈ E imply {s, t} ∈ E′. In this case we write G′ = G[S ′].
The profiles of strategies s, t ∈ S are declared adjacent in G if {s, t} ∈ E or
s = t. We define a G-game with coalition C as the quadruple (V, C,Π, G), where Π
are the payoffs of the coalitions C.
A key concept of the present study is the equilibrium of the G-game in presence
of coalitions.
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Definition 1. Given a graph G = (S, E) and a G-game (V, C,Π, G) where C is a
partition of V , we say that s¯ ∈ S is a pure C-equilibrium for the G-game if
ΠC(s¯) ≥ ΠC([s¯, s;C]), (1)
for any C ∈ C and any s ∈ S such that {s, s¯} ∈ E.
Sometimes we refer to pure C-equilibria simply as C-equilibria.
Notice that the concept of C-equilibrium in Definition 1 coincides with the clas-
sical Berge equilibrium (see [10]) when the considered graph G is complete. Indeed,
Berge equilibrium is a Nash one for coalitions, without any structure of the set of
the strategies. Some easy remarks follow.
Remark 1. If all the nodes of the graph G are isolated, then any s ∈ S is a
C-equilibrium.
If the graph G is complete and C = {{1}, . . . , {n}} then all the couples of elements
of S are formed by adjacent strategies and the G-game becomes the standard game
(V,S, π). In this case, s ∈ S is a C-equilibrium for the G-game (V, C,Π, G) if and
only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium for (V,S, π). If the graph G is complete and
C = {V } with
ΠV (s) =
∑
i∈V
πi(s), for s ∈ S.
Then any C-equilibrium for the G-game is a Pareto optimal solution for the game
(V,S, π). The finiteness of S guarantees that each G-game admits a C-equilibrium
when C = {V } and thetotal payoffof V is the sum of the individual payoffs.
Thus, our definition of C-equilibrium for a G-game is not only more general than
Berge equilibrium, but it is also a generalization of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto
optimal solution for a game.
For a G-game with a coalition structure C, we collect the C-equilibria in the set
EC . The set EC contains the set of the pure Berge equilibria but it can be empty.
3. Mixed C-equilibria
In this section we introduce and analyse the mixed equilibria for a G-game. The
context is static, in the sense that the game is played only one time. Therefore, it
will be clear that all the mixed C-equilibrium, here presented, will not depend on
the choice of the graph G. However, the relevance of the graph will be clear on the
section dealing with the repeated G-games. This part is analogous to Berge (for
coalitions) or Nash mixed equilibria (see [10, 34]); it is presented only for ease of
reading the paper. We notice that in [10, 34] the pure equilibria are also mixed
equilibria. As we will see in our presentation this is not longer true.
A mixed strategy for a coalition C ∈ C is a distribution on SC , and we denote it
by ΛC = (λC(s) : s ∈ SC). In presence of mixed strategies, the payoff of a coalition
C will be a random variable. Reasonably, we will also consider that the single
coalitions act independently one each other because they are not comunicating.
Thus, the choice of the individual mixed strategies for all the coalitions C1, . . . , Cr
fixes also a product distribution on S for the game. Hence, the expected payoff for
coalition C ∈ C is
EΛC1×...×ΛCr
(ΠC) =
∑
sC1∈SC1
· · ·
∑
sCr∈SCr
ΠC(sC1 , . . . , sCr)
[
r∏
ℓ=1
λCℓ(sCℓ)
]
, (2)
where EΛC1×...×ΛCr is the expected value with respect to the product distribution
ΛC1×. . .×ΛCr and ΛCℓ , for ℓ = 1, . . . , r, is the distribution selected by the coalition
Cℓ.
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Definition 2. Let us consider a G-game (V, C,Π, G) with coalition structure C =
{C1, . . . , Cr}. A mixed C-equilibrium for the G-game is a product distribution Λ¯ =∏r
h=1 Λ¯Ch , where
EΛ¯C1×...×Λ¯Cr
(ΠCℓ) ≥ EΛ¯C1×...×Λ¯Cℓ−1×ΛCℓ×Λ¯Cℓ+1×...×Λ¯Cr
(ΠCℓ), (3)
for any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , r} and for any distribution ΛCℓ on the space SCℓ .
We collect all the mixed C-equilibria in the set MC.
As already announced above, Definition 2 does not depend on the presence of
the graph G, and can be provided for a generic game whose strategies are not nodes
of a graph. However, the reference to G-games will be useful in the next Section.
Theorem 1. For a given G-game (V, C,Π, G) there exists a mixed C-equilibrium.
Proof. Let us see the coalition C ∈ C as a single player having space of strategies
given by SC . The payoff of the player identified with the coalition C is ΠC . There-
fore we are dealing with a standard game as defined by Nash in [34]. By applying
Theorem 1 of [34] one obtains the existence of a product distribution Λ¯ =
∏r
i=1 Λ¯Ci
which satisfies (3). 
For a given G-game (V, C,Π, G), let us define
MˆC = {(sC1 , . . . , sCr) ∈ S : δsC1 × . . .× δsCr ∈MC}.
We notice that EC ∩ MˆC is the set of the pure Berge equilibria. Furthermore, in
general, we have that EC 6⊂ MˆC and MˆC 6⊂ EC .
4. Monte Carlo Markov Chain on graphs and repeated G-games
This section deals with a constrained MCMC procedure in presence of graphs
and its application to the repeated G-games, which will be defined below. The
MCMC part can be treated separately and it has a relevance and an interest in
itself.
4.1. MCMC on graphs. We deal with a MCMC problem. In particular, we
construct some Markov chains which are linked to the graph G.
Definition 3. We say that a stochastic process X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) on S is
consistent with the graph G = (S, E) if, for each t ∈ N, X(t) and X(t + 1) are
adjacent in G with probability one.
We notice that if a process X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) is consistent with a graph G then
it is also consistent with any graph G′ ⊃ G.
Given a finite graph G = (S, E) and a distribution µ = (µ(s) : s ∈ S), we will
provid an answer to the following question:
Q Is it possible to construct a (not necessarily homogeneous) Markov chain
X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) which is consistent with G and such that its empirical
distribution converges almost surely to µ as t goes to infinity?
Thus, we want to construct a Markov chainX = (X(t) : t ∈ N) with the following
properties: X is consistent with the graph G and
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} = µ(s), s ∈ S a.s.. (4)
We provide an answer to question Q in all possible situations and we show that
when G is connect it is possible to construct such a Markov chain. Moreover, in
constructing such a Markov chain, we are in the framework of the MCMC the-
ory, even if here the Markov chain is constrained to have transitions only between
adjacent states of G.
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All the possible situations, along with the related answers to question Q, can be
distinguished in four cases:
(i) If the distribution µ is concentrated on a unique s¯ ∈ S, i.e. µ = δs¯, then
one can construct the constant Markov chain X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) such that
X(t) = s¯, for each t. By Definition 3 and the concept of adjacent states,
one has that X is consistent with G and (4) is trivially satisfied.
(ii) If G[supp (µ)] is not connected but supp (µ) is contained in a connected
component of G, then one can construct a nonhomogeneous Markov chain
which is consistent with G and fulfilling condition (4) (see Theorem 2 be-
low).
(iii) If G[supp (µ)] is not connected and supp (µ) is not contained in a unique
connected component of G, then it does not exist a stochastic process which
is consistent with G and fulfilling (4) (see Theorem 3 part b. below).
(iv) If G[supp (µ)] is connected, then one can construct a homogeneous Markov
chain consistent with G which satisfies (4) (see Theorem 3 part a. below).
We now deal with item (ii).
Notice that, in this case, there exists a connected component of S, say Sˆ, such
that supp (µ) ⊂ Sˆ and supp (µ) 6= Sˆ. Without loss of generality and to avoid the
introduction of further notation, we assume that G is connected and we identify Sˆ
with S.
For a given distribution µ = (µ(s) : s ∈ S), let us define, in case (ii), the
non-empty set
Ak =
{
s ∈ S : µ(s) <
1
k
}
, k ≥ 1
and let the distribution ηk = (ηk(s) : s ∈ S) be
ηk(s) =
1
|Ak|
1{s∈Ak}, s ∈ S,
i.e. ηk is the uniform distribution on Ak. We also define the distribution µk =
(µk(s) : s ∈ S) as
µk =
1
k
ηk +
k − 1
k
µ. (5)
Notice that
||µk − µ||TV =
1
k
||ηk − µ||TV ≤
1
k
,
where || · ||TV is the total variation norm (see e.g. [32]).
Let N denote the cardinality of S. Since supp (µ) is not connected in G, then it
contains at least two points. Since supp (µ) ⊂ S and S is connected, then N ≥ 3.
By construction, for k large enough and since N ≥ 3, one has that
µk(s) ≥
1
(N − 1)k
, s ∈ S. (6)
Let us label the elements of S = {s1, . . . , sN} such that
µ(s1) ≥ µ(s2) ≥ · · · ≥ µ(sN ).
Let us take an integer k such that
k >
1
min{µ(s) > 0 : s ∈ S}
.
According to definition (5), with the previous selection of k, one has
µk(s
1) ≥ µk(s
2) ≥ · · · ≥ µk(s
N ) > 0. (7)
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We now construct the transition matrix P (µk,G) = (pl,r : l, r = 1, . . . , N) related
to the distribution µk and to the graph G = (S, E). For each l,m = 1, . . . , N ,
pl,m =


p, if l < m and {sl, sm} ∈ E;
µk(s
m)
µk(sl)
p, if l > m and {sl, sm} ∈ E;
pl, if l = m;
0, otherwise,
(8)
where
pl = 1− p[
∑
m′:m′>l
1{{sl,sm′}∈E} +
∑
m′:m′<l
µk(s
m′)
µk(sl)
1{{sl,sm′}∈E}]
and
p = min
l=1,...,N
1
2
(∑
m′:m′>l 1{{sl,sm′}∈E} +
∑
m′:m′<l
µk(sm
′ )
µk(sl)
1{{sl,sm′}∈E}
) . (9)
Notice that by definition p ≤ 12 . In fact, since G is connected, there exists at least
an edge {s1, sm} ∈ E, with m > 1; thus the denominator of (9) is at least equal to
2, when l = 1. The transition matrix P (µk,G) is well defined, since G is connected.
Formula (8) assures that the couple (µk, P
(µk,G)) is reversible. Moreover, P (µk,G)
is irreducible, since G is connected, thus µk is the unique invariant distribution of
P (µk,G). One can also see that P (µk,G) is aperiodic since, by construction, pl ≥
1
2
for l = 1, . . . , N .
We introduce the ergodic coefficient of Dobrushin (see [20] and [13] p. 235),
which is defined as
δ(P ) = 1− inf
i,j=1,...,N
N∑
h=1
pi,h ∧ pj,h (10)
where P = (pi,j : i, j = 1, . . . , N) is a stochastic matrix.
Lemma 1. Given the transition matrix P (µk,G) on S constructed above, with N =
|S| ≥ 3, the Dobrushin’s ergodic coefficient can be bounded from above as follows
δ((P (µk ,G))N−1) ≤ 1−
(cN
k
)N−1
where cN =
1
2(N−1)2 and k is large enough.
Proof. For k large enough, condition N ≥ 3, and inequalities (6) and (7) provide
1 ≤
µk(s
m)
µk(sl)
≤ k(N − 1), for l > m. (11)
Thus, by (11) one obtains p ≥ cNk , for k large enough. Then one has that, if
pl,m 6= 0,
pl,m ≥
cN
k
. (12)
For k large enough, since the graph G is connected and pl ≥
1
2 for each l = 1, . . . , N ,
then (12) gives that
p
(N−1)
l,m ≥
(cN
k
)N−1
, l,m = 1, . . . , N,
where p
(N−1)
l,m is the transition probability from s
l to sm in (N − 1) steps.
Then, by definition of the ergodic coefficient of Dobrushin in (10), one has the
thesis. 
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For a given distribution over S, namely λ = (λ(s) : s ∈ S), we construct a
non-homogeneous Markov chain X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) with λ as initial distribution.
The transition matrix of the Markov chain X at time t ∈ N will be denoted by
P (t) = (pi,j(t) : i, j = 1, . . . , N).
Let us consider an increasing sequence of times (tℓ : ℓ ∈ N), and pose
P (t) =
∞∑
k=1
P (µk,G)1{t∈[tk,tk+1)}. (13)
Theorem 2. Given a connected graph G = (S, E) and a distribution µ = (µ(s) :
s ∈ S), any Markov chain X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) constructed above with sequence
(tℓ : ℓ ∈ N) and tℓ = ℓ5N , for ℓ ∈ N, satisfies (4).
Proof. To prove the result, we first check that
lim
ℓ→∞
1
tℓ
tℓ−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} = µ(s), s ∈ S a.s.. (14)
By definition of (tℓ : ℓ ∈ N) in the hypotheses, one has
lim
ℓ→∞
tℓ+1 − tℓ
tℓ
= 0,
and then (14) is equivalent to (4).
For ε > 0 and s ∈ S let us define the sequence of events (Bℓ(ε, s) : ℓ ∈ N) as
Bℓ(ε, s) =
{∣∣∣µ(s)− 1
tℓ+1 − tℓ
tℓ+1−1∑
m=tℓ
1{X(m)=s}
∣∣∣ < ε
}
. (15)
To obtain (14) it is enough that, for each ε > 0 and s ∈ S one has
P
(
lim inf
ℓ→∞
Bℓ(ε, s)
)
= 1.
Now, take the auxiliary independent random variables (Y (t) : t ∈ N) with values
on S such that Y (i) has distribution µk if i ∈ [tk, tk+1) (see (5) for the definition
of µk).
Notice that for each initial distribution ϑ on S, Lemma 1 and Dobrushin’s The-
orem (see [13]) give that
||ϑP (tℓ)
ℓ2N−µℓ||TV ≤ δ(P (tℓ)
N−1)⌊
ℓ2N
N−1 ⌋ ≤
(
1−
(cN
ℓ
)N−1)⌊ ℓ2NN−1⌋
≤ exp
(
−cN−1N
⌊
ℓN+1
N − 1
⌋)
,
(16)
for ℓ large enough.
Let cˆN = c
N−1
N . Given i ≥ 0 and k ≥ 1, by the maximal coupling (see [32]) and
inequality (16) one can couple X(tℓ + kℓ
2N + i) with Y (tℓ + kℓ
2N + i) so that
P(X(tℓ + kℓ
2N + i) 6= Y (tℓ + kℓ
2N + i)) ≤ exp
(
−cˆN
⌊
ℓN+1
N − 1
⌋)
, (17)
for ℓ large enough.
Let us define the sequence of events (Aℓ,i : ℓ ∈ N, i ∈ [0, ℓ2N)) by
Aℓ,i =
{
X(tℓ + aℓ
2N + i) = Y (tℓ + aℓ
2N + i) : a ≥ 1 and tℓ + kℓ
2N + i ≤ tℓ+1 − 1
}
,
(18)
for each ℓ ∈ N and i ∈ [0, ℓ2N).
For ℓ large enough and by subadditivity, one has
P(Aℓ,i) ≥ 1− (ℓ + 1)
5N exp
(
−cˆN
⌊
ℓN+1
N − 1
⌋)
.
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We also set Aˆℓ =
⋂ℓ2N−1
i=0 Aℓ,i. Then, for ℓ large enough,
P({X(t) = Y (t) : t ∈ [tℓ+ℓ
2N , tℓ+1)}) = P(Aˆℓ) ≥ 1−(ℓ+1)
7N exp
(
−cˆN
⌊
ℓN+1
N − 1
⌋)
.
(19)
By (19) and the first Borel-Cantelli lemma, it follows that P(lim infℓ→∞ Aˆℓ) = 1.
Now, for ε > 0 and s ∈ S, let us define the sequence of events (Bˆℓ(ε, s) : ℓ ∈ N)
as
Bˆℓ(ε, s) =
{∣∣∣µ(s)− 1
tℓ+1 − tℓ
tℓ+1−1∑
m=tℓ
1{Y (m)=s}
∣∣∣ < ε
2
}
. (20)
A straightforward calculation gives that
lim inf
ℓ→∞
(Bˆℓ(ε, s) ∩ Aˆℓ) ⊂ lim inf
ℓ→∞
Bℓ(ε, s).
Therefore to end the proof it is enough to show that P(lim infℓ→∞ Bˆℓ(ε, s)) = 1.
Such a result is a consequence of the large deviation bounds for i.i.d. Bernoulli
random variables and the first Borel-Cantelli lemma. This concludes the proof. 
Remark 2. The definition of (tℓ : ℓ ∈ N) provided in Theorem 2 represents only
one of the possible choices. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the proof
of Theorem 2 can be adapted to other sequences (tℓ : ℓ ∈ N). For example, one can
take tℓ+1− tℓ ≥ cℓ5N−1, with c > 0. In this case, for any ℓ ∈ N, there exists Iℓ ∈ N
and an increasing sequence
t
(0)
ℓ , t
(1)
ℓ , . . . , t
(Iℓ)
ℓ
such that tℓ = t
(0)
ℓ , t
(Iℓ)
ℓ = tℓ+1 and the following property holds
lim
ℓ→∞
sup
i∈{0,1,...,Iℓ−1}
t
(i+1)
ℓ − t
(i)
ℓ
t
(i)
ℓ
= 0; lim
ℓ→∞
t
(0)
ℓ − t
(Iℓ−1)
ℓ−1
t
(Iℓ−1)
ℓ−1
= 0.
By reproducing the arguments of the proof of Theorem 2 for the new sequences
t
(0)
ℓ , t
(1)
ℓ , . . . , t
(Iℓ)
ℓ , one obtains that a new Markov chain defined with this new se-
quence of times satisfies (4).
Next example shows that the convergence of the distribution µk to the distribu-
tion µ should not be taken too fast and tℓ+1 − tℓ should be not taken too small in
order to have (4).
Example 1. Let us consider a graph G = (S, E) with S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and
E = {{s1, s3}, {s3, s4}, {s2, s4}}.
Let us take the distribution µ = (µ(s) : s ∈ S) having µ(s1) = µ(s2) = 12 , and
define tℓ = ℓ, for each ℓ ∈ N, and the sequence of distributions (µˆℓ : ℓ ∈ N) where
µˆℓ = µ2ℓ . We take a non-homogeneous Markov chain X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) with
transition matrix P (ℓ) = (pm,n(ℓ) : m,n = 1, 2, 3, 4), at time ℓ, given by
P (ℓ) = P (µˆℓ,G), ℓ ∈ N.
In particular, ||µˆℓ − µ||TV ≤
1
2ℓ
.
A straightforward computation gives that at time ℓ
p =
1
2ℓ+1
, (21)
accordingly to the definition of p given in (9). Thus, (21) gives that p1,1(ℓ) = 1−
1
2ℓ+1
at time ℓ. Therefore, the Borel-Cantelli’s Lemma guarantees that
|{ℓ ∈ N : X(ℓ) = s1, X(ℓ+ 1) 6= s1}| <∞ a.s.,
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and therefore
P(
⋂
s∈S
{ lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} = µ(s)}) = 0.
Notice that Example 1 gives a natural comparison between our setting and the
simulated annealing (see [30]). In both cases the hope is that the rate of convergence
is fast but, if one tries to have an excessively high rate of convergence, it leads to
local minima (case of simulated annealing) or not convergence to the distribution µ
(case of our framework). In this case, the response to question Q might be wrong,
even if the Markov chain is consistent with the graph G.
Next result provides an answer to Q for items (iii) and (iv).
Theorem 3. The following two sentences hold true:
a. if G[supp (µ)] is connected, then each homogeneous Markov chain X =
(X(t) : t ∈ N) with state space supp (µ) having transition matrix equal to
P (µ,G[supp (µ)]) defined in (8) satisfies (4). Furthermore, X is consistent
with G;
b. if G[supp (µ)] is not connected, then each homogeneous Markov chain con-
sistent with G does not satisfies (4).
Proof. We prove a.. Since G[supp (µ)] is connected, then the transition matrix
P (µ,G[supp (µ)]) is well defined. Moreover, µ is the unique invariant distribution of
P (µ,G[supp (µ)]) because P (µ,G[supp (µ)]) is irreducible. Now, by applying the ergodic
theorem, one has (4). The consistence of X with G follows from the fact that, for
l 6= m, pl,m > 0 implies {sl, sm} ∈ E.
We prove b. by contradiction. Assume that (4) holds true for a Markov chain
(X(t) : t ∈ N). Then for each s ∈ supp (µ) one has
P({X(t) = s, i.o.}) = 1. (22)
Let us consider s′, s′′ ∈ supp (µ) which belong to two different connected compo-
nents of G[supp (µ)]. By (22), it follows that P(T <∞) = 1 where
T = inf{t ∈ N : X(t) ∈ {s′, s′′}}.
Without loss of generality one can assume that P(X(T ) = s′) > 0. Then, by the
consistence of X with the graph G, one has that
P({t ∈ N : X(t) = s′′} = ∅|X(T ) = s′) = 1.
Therefore
P({X(t) = s′′, i.o.}) < 1,
and this contradicts (22). 
Remark 3. We notice that, by Theorem 3 a., it is possible, for any ε > 0, to select
a homogeneous Markov chain X = (X(t) : t ∈ N) having transition matrix equal to
P (µk,G) (see (5) and (8)), with k ≥ ⌈ 1ε⌉, satisfying
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} − µ(s)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, s ∈ S a.s.. (23)
Furthermore, X is consistent with G.
Some consequences of Theorems 2 and 3 arise. Let us consider a function f :
S → R
Under condition of Theorem 2 or of Theorem 3 a. one obtains
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
f(X(m)) = Eµ(f), a.s., (24)
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where Eµ is the expected value with respect to the distribution µ, i.e.
Eµ(f) =
∑
s∈S
f(s)µ(s).
If (23) holds true, then
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t−1∑
m=0
f(X(m))− Eµ(f)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ εmaxs∈S |f(s)|, a.s.. (25)
We now need the definition of product of graphs. The usefulness of such a
definition will be clear in the next section on the repeated games. Thus, in the
light of the subsequent definitions and results, we use the same notation employed
in the formalization of the games.
Definition 4. Given a finite set V , a partition C = {C1, . . . , Cr} of V and a
connected finite graph G = (S, E) where S =
∏
j∈V Sj, we say that G is C-
decomposable if G = G1 ⊗ G2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Gr, where G1 = (SC1 , E1), . . . , Gr =
(SCr , Er) and ⊗ is the strong product for graphs introduced by [37], i.e. given
(sC1 , . . . , sCr), (s¯C1 , . . . , s¯Cr) ∈ S they are adjacent with respect to G if and only if
for any ℓ = 1, . . . , r the vertices sCℓ , s¯Cℓ ∈ SCℓ are adjacent with respect to Gℓ. We
say that G = (G1, . . . , Gr) is the C-decomposition of G.
We point out that, for a given coalition structure C, if the graph G has a C-
decomposition G′ = (G′1, . . . , G
′
r) then it is unique.
We also notice that a complete graph is trivially C-decomposable, for each parti-
tion C = {C1, . . . , Cr} of V . In this case, the graphs G1, . . . , Gr of G are complete.
We consider C = {C1, . . . , Cr} a partition of V , a C-decomposable graph G =
(S, E) with C-decomposition given by G = (G1, . . . , Gr), where Gh = (SCh , Eh), for
each h = 1, . . . , r. Let us take a product distribution µ =
∏r
h=1 µCh , where µCh is
a distribution on the space SCh .
In order to proceed, we construct r independent Markov chains XC1 = (XC1(t) :
t ∈ N), . . . , XCr = (XCr(t) : t ∈ N) such that the h-th Markov chain XCh has state
space SCh and an arbitrary initial distribution λCh = (λCh(sCh) : sCh ∈ SCh), for
each h = 1, . . . , r.
Moreover, by replacing S with SCh and µ with µCh , we replicate the construction
provided before Theorem 2. In so doing, we take k ∈ N to define the distribution
µCh,k = (µCh,k(sCh) : sCh ∈ SCh).
Now, take a sequence of increasing times (t
(Ch)
ℓ : ℓ ∈ N), such that
min
h=1,...,r
t
(Ch)
ℓ+1 − t
(Ch)
ℓ ≥ cℓ
5N−1, (26)
with c a positive constant.
The transition matrices of XCh are (PCh(t) : t ∈ N) as in (13):
PCh(t) =
∞∑
k=1
P (µCh,k,Gh)1
{t∈[t
(Ch)
k
,t
(Ch)
k+1 )}
. (27)
We introduce the Markov chain X = (X(t) = (XC1(t), . . . , XCr(t)) ∈ S : t ∈ N).
Next result is similar to Theorem 2 but it is based on the r independent Markov
chains constructed above. In the context of MCMC, this framework provides a
remarkable simplification of the computational complexity, in that dealing with r
independent Markov chains with state spaces SC1 , . . . ,SCr is more affordable than
only one Markov chain with state space given by S = SC1× . . .×SCr . Furthermore,
as we will see and as preannounced above, such a context will be of theoretical
usefulness in defining the repeated G-games.
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Theorem 4. Let us consider a finite set V and a partition C = {C1, . . . , Cr} of
V . Let S =
∏r
ℓ=1 SCℓ and a C-decomposable connected graph G = (S, E), with
C-decomposition G = (G1, . . . , Gr).
Let us take a product distribution µ =
∏r
h=1 µCh and consider the r independent
Markov chains XC1 = (XC1(t) : t ∈ N), . . . , XCr = (XCr (t) : t ∈ N) constructed
above, and the Markov chain X = ((XC1(t), . . . , XCr(t) : t ∈ N).
Then
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} = lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
r∏
h=1
1{XCh (m)=sCh}
=
r∏
h=1
µCh(sCh) = µ(s),
(28)
for each s = (sC1 , . . . , sCr) ∈ S.
Proof. By (26) follows that
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣[0, t] ∩ (⋃rh=1⋃∞ℓ=1[t(Ch)ℓ , t(Ch)ℓ + ℓ2N))∣∣∣
t
= 0.
In fact, for each h = 1, . . . , r,
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣[0, t] ∩ (⋃∞ℓ=1[t(Ch)ℓ , t(Ch)ℓ + ℓ2N))∣∣∣
t
= 0,
since
lim
ℓ→∞
ℓ2N
t
(Ch)
ℓ+1 − t
(Ch)
ℓ
≤ lim
ℓ→∞
ℓ2N
cℓ5N−1
= 0.
Thus, the times in
⋃r
h=1
⋃∞
ℓ=1[t
(Ch)
ℓ , t
(Ch)
ℓ + ℓ
2N) can be neglected in the procedure
of checking (28), i.e.
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} = lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} · 1{m/∈
⋃
r
h=1
⋃
∞
ℓ=1[t
(Ch)
ℓ
,t
(Ch)
ℓ
+ℓ2N )}
and also
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{X(m)=s} = lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
[
1{X(m)=s} + 1{m∈
⋃
r
h=1
⋃
∞
ℓ=1[t
(Ch)
ℓ
,t
(Ch)
ℓ
+ℓ2N )}
]
.
Let us define the set of times A =
⋃r
h=1
⋃∞
ℓ=1[t
(Ch)
ℓ , t
(Ch)
ℓ + ℓ
2N). Now we introduce
the independent random variables (YCh(t) : t ∈ N, h = 1, . . . , r). The random
variables (YCh(t) : t ∈ N), with label h, take value on SCh . Moreover, if t ∈
[t
(Ch)
k , t
(Ch)
k+1 ) then YCh(t) has distribution µCh,k.
We now adapt formula (17) to the Markov chain XCh . If t¯ /∈ A then for each
h = 1, . . . , r there exists ℓ¯h such that t¯ belong to [t
(Ch)
ℓ¯h
, t
(Ch)
ℓ¯h+1
). In this case formula
(17) becomes
P(XCh(t¯) = YCh(t¯)) ≥ 1− exp
(
−cˆN
⌊
ℓ¯N+1h
N − 1
⌋)
, (29)
where we recall that cˆN =
1
[2(N−1)2]N−1 .
Hence, for any t¯ /∈ A one has that there exist ℓ¯1, . . . , ℓ¯r ∈ N such that t¯ ∈⋂r
h=1[t
(Ch)
ℓ¯h
+ℓ¯2Nh , t
(Ch)
ℓ¯h+1
). Therefore, using the independence of the random variables
Y ’s and the independence of the Markov chains X ’s, one has
P((XC1(t¯), . . . , XCr(t¯)) = (YC1(t¯), . . . , YCr(t¯))) ≥ 1−
r∑
h=1
exp
(
−cˆN
⌊
ℓ¯N+1h
N − 1
⌋)
.
(30)
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For t¯ ∈
⋂r
h=1[t
(Ch)
ℓ¯h
+ ℓ¯2Nh , t
(Ch)
ℓ¯h+1
), the distribution of (YC1(t¯), . . . , YCr (t¯)) coincides
with
∏r
h=1 µCh,ℓ¯h .
Thus, we have ∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣µ−
r∏
h=1
µCh,ℓ¯h
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤
r∑
h=1
1
ℓ¯h
. (31)
Notice that any ℓ¯h increases to infinity when t¯ goes to infinity. Therefore, the left-
hand side of (31) goes to zero as t¯ goes to infinity. Inequalities (30) and (31) give
an upper bound for the distance in total variation between the law of X(t¯) and the
distribution µ.
Now, by following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain equation
(28). 
In the same setting of the previous theorem, consider a graph G = (S, E) and
a connected graph G′ = (S, E′) such that E′ ⊂ E and G′ is C-decomposable.
Theorem 4 can be applied to the graph G′ and the Markov chain X . In any case
X is also consistent with the graph G, which is connected by construction having
more edges than G′. Thus, in some sense, Theorem 4 can be applied also to the
supergraph G of G′.
4.2. Repeated G-games. We now give the general definition of a repeated game
in presence of a coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}, and then we present our
specific setting.
Definition 5. A repeated game is a game played T times, with T ∈ N ∪ {∞}, by
a set of players V with a coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}, where the coalition
C ∈ C has set of strategies SC . Each coalition C ∈ C has a initial strategy sC(0)
at time t = 0. Furthermore, coalition C selects at time 1 ≤ t < T a strategy
sC(t) ∈ SC , where such a selection can depend only on the available information
on the previous history of the game. The payoff function of C ∈ C at any time is
given by ΠC : S → R. The payoff of the T times repeated game for the coalition
C ∈ C is
Π
(T )
C =


1
T
∑T−1
m=0ΠC(sC1(m), . . . , sCr(m)), if T <∞;
lim inft→∞
1
t
∑t−1
m=0ΠC(sC1(m), . . . , sCr(m)), if T =∞.
In the proposed context of G-games, each coalition C can select at time t + 1
only a strategy (or action) sC(t+ 1) that is adjacent to the strategy sC(t) selected
at time t. Such a requirement cannot be satisfied for a general graph, because it
would imply the construction of a strategy sC(t+1) by knowing the decisions that
are doing the other coalitions. To convince the reader of this problem, we present
a simple example in the setting of two players.
Example 2. Consider V = {1, 2}, S = S1 × S2, with S1 ≡ S2 ≡ {s1, s2}. The
graph is G = (S, E), where
E = {((s1, s1), (s2, s1)), ((s1, s1), (s1, s2)), ((s1, s2), (s2, s2)), ((s2, s1), (s2, s2))}.
Notice that (s1, s1) and (s2, s2) are not adjacent, and therefore it is impossible to
have that s(t) = (s1, s1) and s(t+ 1) = (s2, s2). In any case, both players have the
opportunity to move from s1 to s2 if the other player decides to remain in s1.
Thus, the selection of the strategy by a player should not depend only on the past,
but also on the current choices of the other player. However, this situation is not
considered in Definition 5.
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For the reasons expressed above and explained through Example 2 we will define
the repeated G-games when G can be written as product of graphs according to
Definition 4.
We are ready to present the definition of repeated G-games.
Definition 6. Consider a connected graph G = (S, E), a set of players V and
a coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. Assume that G = (G1, . . . , Gr) is the C-
decomposition of G. A repeated G-game is a repeated game such that, for t ∈ N,
any coalition C ∈ C can select at time t+ 1 only strategies sC(t+ 1)’s in SC which
are adjacent to the strategy sC(t) ∈ SC selected at time t.
Let us focus on the information. We will present two extreme cases.
(IM ) All the coalitions are aware about the previous history of the repeated
game. This is the maximum available level of information, called maximal
information.
(Im) Any coalition has knowledge of time t and of its previously selected strate-
gies before t, without any information on the choices of the others coalitions.
We call this case minimal information.
We also assume that the vector of the initial strategies of the coalitions at time
zero are of two types.
(P0) The initial strategies are decided by the players themselves.
(R0) There is a referee of the game who assigns the initial strategies.
In both cases when the information is minimal the coalitions are not aware about
the initial strategies of the others.
We notice that it is often not possible or really hard to load the entire past
history of the game into memory. Therefore, we will focus mainly on Markovian
processes, where the only datum needed is the current time t and the strategy
selected at time t− 1.
We now present an immediate result showing the relevance of the pure C-equilibria,
given in Definition 1, for T = 2.
Theorem 5. Consider a repeated G-game with coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}
where T = 2, information is of type (IM ) and initial strategies are of type (R0). If
the vector of initial strategies s¯ = (s¯C1 , . . . , s¯Cr ) ∈ EC , then it is a Berge equilibrium
for C at time t = 1 where the space of strategies available to any coalition C ∈ C is
restricted to the strategies adjacent to s¯C.
We also believe that C-equilibria, defined in Section 2, become relevant when the
coalitions are not aware about the terminal time of the game. This is the case of a
final stage of the game not under the control of the single coalitions. For instance,
each coalition has the opportunity to abandon the game and such an abandonment
would determine the end of the game itself. In a different context, the game might
end at the occurrence of an event whose distribution is not known. In all such
situations one can reasonably guess that coalitions do not consider the consequences
on the long-term of their strategies and they play the game by implicitly assuming
that each round is the last one. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that if the coalitions
achieve at time t¯ a C-equilibrium, then they will play such strategies at each time
t > t¯. Indeed, such a way to play leads to a stage-wise maximization of their
payoffs.
We are ready to give the definition of equilibrium for the repeated G-games.
According to the specific framework we will focus on, we restrict our attention to
the case of minimal information and T =∞.
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Definition 7. Consider a connected graph G = (S, E) and a repeated G-game
with coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. Assume that G = (G1, . . . , Gr) is the
C-decomposition of G. Assume T =∞, minimal information and initial strategies
of type (P0) or (R0). Consider r adapted and independent stochastic processes
XC1 = (XC1(t) : t ∈ N), . . . , XCr = (XCr(t) : t ∈ N) taking values in SC1 , . . . ,SCr
and consistent with G1, . . . , Gr, respectively.
We say that X = (XC1 , . . . , XCr) is a C-equilibrium for the repeated G-game
when
E(lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
j=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCr(m))) ≥
≥ E(lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
j=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCℓ−1(m), X˜Cℓ(m), XCℓ+1(m), . . . , XCr(m))),
(32)
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , r and for any adapted stochastic process X˜Cℓ which is consistent
with Gℓ and independent from XC1 , . . . , XCℓ−1, XCℓ+1 , . . . , XCr .
The previous definition is meaningful only in the case of minimal information
because we are requiring the independence of the strategy processes. We now
illustrate the connection between the equilibria in MC and the C-equilibria for the
repeated G-games defined in Definition 7. Specifically, we will present a version of
the Folk Theorem for our framework. To proceed, we need a preliminary general
result. We state it directly in the language of the G-games, for the sake of notation.
Theorem 6. Consider a connected graph G = (S, E) and a repeated G-game with
coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. Assume T = ∞ and that G = (G1, . . . , Gr)
is the C-decomposition of G. Consider ΛC1 × . . . × ΛCr ∈ MC and r independent
Markov chains XC1 = (XC1(t) : t ∈ N), . . . , XCr = (XCr(t) : t ∈ N) with state
space SC1 , . . . ,SCr and consistent with G1, . . . , Gr, respectively, such that
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
r∏
h=1
1{XCh (m)=sCh}
=
r∏
h=1
ΛCh(sCh), a.s., (33)
for each sCh ∈ SCh .
Then, almost surely,
Π
(∞)
Cℓ
= EΛC1×...ΛCr (ΠCℓ) = limt→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCr(m)) ≥
≥ E(lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
j=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCℓ−1(m), X˜Cℓ(m), XCℓ+1(m), . . . , XCr(m))).
(34)
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , r and stochastic process X˜Cℓ consistent with Gℓ and independent
from the Markov chains XC1 , . . . , XCℓ−1, XCℓ+1 , . . . , XCr .
Proof. By formula (24) we deduce the first two equalities in (34), so we have to
prove only the inequality in (24).
Let us take ℓ = 1, . . . , r. Consider a stochastic process X˜Cℓ consistent with Gℓ
and independent from the Markov chains XC1 , . . . , XCℓ−1, XCℓ+1 , . . . , XCr . From
the finiteness of S one has the tightness of the distributions on S. Therefore, there
exists a sequence (tn : n ∈ N) and a distribution Λ˜Cℓ on SCℓ such that
lim
n→∞
1
tn
tn−1∑
m=0
1{X˜Cℓ (m)=sCℓ}
= Λ˜Cℓ(sCℓ), a.s., (35)
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for each sCℓ ∈ SCℓ .
The independence assumption of X˜Cℓ from XC1 , . . . , XCℓ−1, XCℓ+1 , . . . , XCr and
(35) give
E( lim
n→∞
1
tn
tn−1∑
m=0
1{(XC1 (m),...,XCℓ−1(m),X˜Cℓ (m),XCℓ+1(m),...,XCr (m))=s}
) =
= Λ˜Cℓ(sCℓ)

 ∏
k=1,...,r;k 6=ℓ
ΛCk(sCk)

 , (36)
for any s = (sC1 , . . . , sCr) ∈ S. Thus, (36) leads to
E( lim
n→∞
1
tn
tn−1∑
m=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCℓ−1(m), X˜Cℓ(m), XCℓ+1(m), . . . , XCr(m))) =
= EΛC1×...ΛCℓ−1×Λ˜Cℓ×ΛCℓ+1×...×ΛCr
(ΠCℓ). (37)
By the assumption that ΛC1 × . . .× ΛCr ∈MC , one has that
EΛC1×...ΛCℓ−1×Λ˜Cℓ×ΛCℓ+1×...×ΛCr
(ΠCℓ) ≤ EΛC1×...×ΛCr (ΠCℓ).
The thesis comes from
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCℓ−1(m), X˜Cℓ(m), XCℓ+1(m), . . . , XCr(m)) ≤
≤ lim
n→∞
1
tn
tn−1∑
m=0
ΠCℓ(XC1(m), . . . , XCℓ−1(m), X˜Cℓ(m), XCℓ+1(m), . . . , XCr(m)).

The previous theorem says that the considered Markov chains form a C-equilibrium
for the repeated G-game when T =∞, initial strategies of types (P0) or (R0) and
minimal information (see Definition 7). From Theorem 4 we know that such Markov
chains exist and we have constructed them. We point out that Equation (33) rep-
resents a global condition on the empirical distribution related to all the coalitions.
Differently, Theorem 4 contains a local condition which actually implies (33). In
fact, in Theorem 4 we have constructed r independent Markov chains such that if
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
1{XCℓ (m)=sCℓ}
= ΛCℓ(sCℓ), a.s.,
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , r, then one obtains also (33). This is relevant in game theory
at least in the case of minimal information. In fact, the independence assumption
of the considered Markov chains is always valid under the condition of minimal
information. In fact, in such cases, any coalition does not know the strategies
selected at the previous steps by the other coalitions playing the game.
By Theorems 4 and Theorem 6, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. Consider a connected graph G = (S, E) and a repeated G-game with
coalition structure C = {C1, . . . , Cr}. Assume T = ∞, initial strategies of types
(P0) or (R0) and information of type (Im). Assume also that G = (G1, . . . , Gr) is
the C-decomposition of G.
For any ΛC1 × . . .×ΛCr ∈ MC, there exist r independent Markov chains XC1 =
(XC1(t) : t ∈ N), . . . , XCr = (XCr(t) : t ∈ N) with state space SC1 , . . . ,SCr and
consistent with G1, . . . , Gr, respectively, such that X = (XC1 , . . . , XCr) is a C-
equilibrium for the repeated G-game.
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Corollary 1 is a version of the Folk Theorem in our framework, which guarantees
the existence of C-equilibria for the repeated game. It is also important that the
C-equilibria analysed are Markovian that means that the single coalition has to
memorize only the current time and the strategy played in the previous stage of
the game.
As a by-product, Corollary 1 can be also related to the memory K of the single
coalitions – i.e., the knowledge by a coalition C ∈ C of the strategies played at
the previous K stages of the repeated G-games by C. In particular, it states that
the C-equilibria are equilibria for any repeated G-games where any coalition has at
least memory K = 1.
5. Conclusions
This paper has introduced and analyzed theG-games, i.e. games whose strategies
are nodes of a graph G. This class of games presents interesting features either
under a theoretical as well as under a practical point of view.
Indeed, several real-world situations can be modeled through game models where
the players are physically constrained to move sequentially from a strategy to an
adjacent one. The introduction of a graph of the strategies serves to capture such
constraints. We specifically deal with G-games with a coalition structure. In so
doing, we admit the presence of interactions among the players. Notice that the
presented framework does not exclude the case of absence of constraints – one can
takeG complete – and the possibility of noncooperative games – by taking coalitions
formed by single players.
A detailed exploration of several aspects is carried out. In particular, we define
the equilibria of the coalitions of pure and mixed type and present a version of the
Folk Theorem for the class of infinitely played G-repeated games with connected G.
The definition of C-equilibria represents an extension of the (pure) Berge and Nash
equilibria. However, we do not enter here the challenging problem of equilibria
selection (see the seminal work [27] and e.g. [11, 14, 21, 26, 29, 40]), leaving this
topic for future research.
It is important to note that Theorem 4 can be seen as an universality result. In
fact, assume that multiple equilibria are attained and a selection criterion identifies
one of them as the valid one for all the coalitions. Then, such a valid equilibrium
can be achieved under the requirement that G is connected.
We also point out that coalitions are fixed in the developed game model. The
theme of coalition structure generation – i.e., the problem of partitioning the play-
ers, according to a specific criterion (see e.g. [38, 39]) – is beyond the material
presented in this paper. Also such a challenging research theme is left for future
development of the study of the G-games.
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